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Abstract 
'New governance approaches' have flourished in EU studies after the Maastricht. Although the 
scholars who take these approaches have offered various viewpoints, the EU is commonly 
regarded as a sui generis system from a postnational perspective. The purpose of this paper is to 
review the current studies on these approaches and to propose one research strategy in order to 
make the studies more elaborate. Chapter I examines the implication of 'governance', and 
shows the difference between international relations and EU studies in terms of usage. Chapter 
2 clarifies the target of new governance approaches in EU studies and delineates the 
postnational perspective. Chapter 3 presents the problem of how it is possible to differentiate 
between a national, an intemational, and an EU Iegal order, with the view to regarding a legal 
order as outcome and moment of governance, and offers one research strategy as a socio-legal 
approach that investigates the relation between a legal order and a mode of social integration. 
*USUl, Yoichiro [Niigata University of Intemational and Inforrnation Studies] 
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This paper concludes that the socio-legal approach is necessary for the postnational perspective . 
of new governance approaches to catch up with the transformation of a sovereign nation-state 
in the EU. 
Introduction 
Throughout the past decade, we have read many discourses on the limit of sovereignty in the 
age of globalisation. However, there had already been a high degree of interdependence among 
states since the birth of the modern sovereign nation-state. The response to the fact was, at least 
in Europe, the formation of international organisations (Schermers and Blokker 1995: 1-3). 
This has made it impossible for national autonomy to remain unscathed, although autonomy 
ought to be reflection of national sovereignty. European integration can be basically understood 
as one of the traditional streams in Europe towards intemational cooperation. Along with these 
perpetual movements, came the horrible nightmares of the First and Second World War, as well 
as the diametrical relation between Germany and France, which became significant moments to 
form consensus about integration movements. 
Nevertheless, I think that the astonishing development of globalisation since the late 80's has 
decisively forced European countries to recognaise the limitation of national autonomy, and the 
need for organising cooperative action among them at a supranational level. The creation of the 
EU is understandable in this context. 
The Treaty on EU (TEU) says in its preamble: 'Recalling the historic importance of the 
ending of the division of European continent and the need to create firm bases for the 
construction of the future Europe' 1. This statement draws attention to the following question: 
What situation would be 'the ending of the division', and what form would 'the construction 
of the future Europe' take? The experience in the EU seems to challenge the notion of a 
sovereign nation-state. In a sense, 'the ending of the division' and 'the construction of the 
l European Communities, European Union Consolidated Treaties of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities), 1997. 
While numbering of articles both of EU and EC treaty has been changed in Amsterdam Treaty, this booklet puts old 
numbering on text along with new one. 
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future Europe' have led to the transformation of a political community fronl a sovereign 
nation-state. What kind of polity, then, is emerging in Europe? 
It is the new governance approaches that flourished in the 90's that tackled this problem. 
These approaches consider the EU as a sui generis system from a postnational perspective. 
Jachtenfuchs, one of main scholars of the new governance approaches, contends that: 
governance by and within the European Union is developing towards a 
model of political organization which cannot be adequately described 
anymore by the concept of the externally and internally sovereign state. 
(Jachtenfuchs 1997b: 39) 
The main purpose of the approaches is to relativise the notion of 'sovereign state' and 
conceptualise 'govemance beyond the state which does not mean governance above the state' 
(Ibid., 41). The 'governance beyond the state' signifies the transformation of a sovereign 
nation-state. In this sense, the adjective "new" is attached to the approaches. In order to realise 
this new situation, the viewpoint of post-modernism has been seen as necessary (Ward 1995). 
Many scholars of this approaches have hence advocated an anti-rationalist view and offered 
structure-centred and sociological institutionalist approaches to which such labels as 'social 
constructivism' or 'reflectivism' have frequently been attached (Jcrgensen 1997; Christiansen, 
Jcrgensen and Wiener 1999; Wind 1997; Jachtenfuchs 1995). 
This paper reviews the current scholarship on governance approaches, and claims that, 
although the new governance approaches to the EU have great ambitions and the postnational 
perspective of the approaches may be excitatory for social scientists, we should reconsider the 
studies associated with legal scholarship in order to clarify current popular assumptions･of the 
approaches. This paper suggests a socio-legal approach as a research strategy to exploit legal 
and sociological view,points for the new govemance approaches. 
Chapter I Iooks at the implications of the term 'governance' itself and examines the 
difference between 'governance without government' (Rosenau 1992) in international 
relations and 'governance beyond the state' in EU studies. This paper points out that, while the 
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former has focussed on the order within a sovereign state system, the latter has directed 
attention to the transformation of the very same system. Chapter 2 turns to governance studies 
on the EU and overviews their characteristics. This paper suggests that the empirical conception 
of the new governance approaches is conceptually inconsistent; the EU system has acquired 
'stateness' (Shaw and Wiener 2000) without rejecting the 'stateness' of Member States. 
Chapter 3 Iinks governance approaches to a socio-legal approach; firstly by proposing to 
examine how it is possible to differentiate among a national, an international, and an EU Iegal 
order on the basis of a dual dynamism, namely the evolution of legal norms and the unfolding 
of collective consciousness, secondly by propounding to consider the relation between a legal 
order and a mode of social integration. This paper offers the following viewpoints. On the one 
hand, a legal order is the outcome as well as the moment of governance. On the other hand, the 
legitimacy of a legal order depends on a mode of social integration. From these viewpoints, this 
paper argues that the new governance approaches on the EU should direct attention to what 
mode of social integration can legitimise the legal order of 'governance beyond the state'. This 
study on the relation between a legal order and a mode of social integration can be called a 
socio-legal approach to the new governance of the EU. 
1 What is 'GOVernance' ?: ItS Implication 
1-1 MeaningS Of Governance 
This section defines the meanings of 'governance' and explores its implication for this paper 
by reviewing the current scholarship. 
The term 'governance' has various meanings in both academic and political discourse. 
Rhodes refers to this term with the following six separate uses: 'as the minimal state, as 
corporate governance, as the new public management, as "good governance", as a socio-
cybernetic system, as self-organizing networks' (Rhodes 1996: 653). In spite of this 
equivocality, we can say that the term 'governance' connotes a certain operation for public 
problem-solving and order-creating. When this term is applied to a public order at a national or 
international le~el, we holds two different points of view. The first is governance by formal 
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institutions of a state, especially, a government. In this popular view, we can regard governance 
as the action of an organ which domestic law has institutionalised. The second is governance by 
all social actors along with governments (Commission on Global Governance 1994). In this 
unusual context, we can consider governance the general function for public problem-solving 
and order-creating. According to Rosenau, the second is 'a system of rule' (Rosenau 1992). He 
explains governance in the broad sense as follows: 
It [governance] embraces governmental institutions, but it also subsumes 
informal, non-governmental mechanisms whereby those persons and 
organizations within its purview move ahead, satisfy their needs, and fulfill 
their wants. 
(Ibid., 4) 
The usage in this context thus highlights that a government is not an only actor for 
govemance. In other words, governance is feasible even though it cannot depend on a formal, 
central, and hierarchically-organised authority. Rosenau formalises this usage as governance 
without government', and defines it in the following functions: 'to prevent conflicts', 'to 
procure resources', and 'to frame goals and policies' (Ibid., 3). Not only from a theoretical 
possibility, but also empirical evidences in environmental issues, these arguments raise the 
following problems, which force us to reconsider our current way of thinking. 
The burden of proof may actually reside with those who maintain that the 
establishment of governments or more limited public authorities is necessary 
to achieve these ends because the operation of any government or organized 
public authority is costly, both in material terms (for example, the funds 
required to run public agencies) and in terms of more intangible values (for 
instance, the bureaucratic inefficiencies and the restrictions on individual 
liberties imposed by even the most enlightened of governments). 
(Young 1997 : 4) 
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The concept of 'governance without government' has been in fashion among 
internationalists. The situation in the late twentieth-century makes us confront with a difficult 
task of order-creating imposed by greater interdependence through economic globalisation, 
security issues after cold war, and global environmental problems. The situation also makes us 
expect an excitatory new order emergence owing to the demise of sovereignty, activation of 
non-governmental organisations, and the quickening of a global civil society. In these 
circumstances, 'Ls]ome of the functions of governance . . . are now being performed by 
activities that do not originate with governments' (Ibid., 3). Gbvernance has thus been 'a 
distinctive motto for international public order' (Kennedy 1997: 548). Kennedy sums up this 
circumstance as follows: 
"Governance" in this literature, as opposed to "government", is the complex 
of more or less formalized bundles of rules, roles, and relationships that 
define the social practices of state and non-state actors interacting in various 
issue areas, rather than formal interstate organizations with budgets and 
buildings and authority to apply rules and impose sanctions. 
(Ibid., 549) 
This research perspective attempts to relativise the very existence of govemment, which has 
important implications for the public order both on a national and an international level. With 
regard to a national level, these governance arguments imply that a national government can no 
longer be the only centre for public problem-solving. The fact that a nation-state has been faced 
with limits in terms of responsibility and ability has been admitted externally through 
globalisation and internally through highly differentiated social-part-system, which has been 
pointed out by systems theory (cf. Luhmann 1984). The former has hollowed out sovereignty, 
and the latter has hollowed out hierarchy (Jachtenfuchs 1995: 122-3). In this context, we can ' 
state that governance by a minimum state is available within a nation state. Deregulation with 
the aim of exploiting market mechanism, the replacement of a public with private sector in a 
welfare policy arena, and the reform~tion from ex ante control by the discretion of government 
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to ex post arbitration by judiciary may be cases to be assumed through this conception. This 
relativisation of government by differentiating between governance and government may be 
filled with the idea of liberalism. According to Rhodes' arrangement, 'the minimal state', 'the 
new public management', and 'good governance' refer to governance based on liberalism 
(Rhodes 1996 : 653-656). As Kennedy points out, this liberalism is also a possible fundamental 
idea in an international order which is defined as govemance without government (Kennedy 
1997: 549). 
With regard to the international level, this concept would relativise the very notion of the 
territory of a nation-state. Along with the evolution of globalisation, interdependence and the 
external diseconomies caused by it have increased to a higher degree. In this context, there are 
two areas of difficulty: Issues in which no state is involved and issues in which all states are 
involved. This suggests that it would be important to inquire the feasibility of public problem-
solving and order-creating in such a space that is not structured by a state form. The conception 
of 'governance without government' implicates necessary change of perspective: from 
' governance within a national border' to ' governance beyond a national border'. This change 
of perspective would be important for EU studies. In a sovereign nation-state model, three 
elements of the political system, i.e. state, government, and governance, have formed a 
harmonious whole. Europeanisation through the evolution of European integration has forced 
us to sharply differentiate among these three elements (Caporaso 1996: 32-3). This conceptual 
differentiation is based on the assumption that the expected function of a state could be camied 
out without a state-like structure. 
1-2 International RelatiOnS and EU studieS 
As far as interdependence inevitably emerges, every society constantly faces collective-action 
problems. Governance in order to solve the problems is necessarily postulated at all level of 
society from the local to the global level (Young 1997: 3-4). According to Young's 
understanding, it is a regime that activates this governance, and the elements of the regime are 
'social institutions that consist of agreed upon principles, norms, rules, decision-making 
procedures, and programs that govern the interactions of actors in s~ecific issue areas ' (Ibid., 
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5-6). There are two possible patterns for a regime that is created out of social institutions: a 
state-organised regime and a non-state regime (Ibid., 6). Although both international relations 
and EU studies have investigated the non-state as well as the state-organised regime by using 
the term 'governance', it seems that the fundamental aim of each has been different. In 
international relations, the focus has been on the conditions of effective collective problem-
solving in an arena of world politics consisting of sovereign states which insistently pursue 
their own interests. The concerns have been about why world politics does not necessarily fall 
into chaos despite lacking the formal authority based on clear competence and responsibility. 
Rosenau sets up a task to be inquired by the governance studies in the following manner: 
Given an order that lacks a centralized authority with the capacity to enforce 
decisions on a global scale, it follows that a prime task, of inquiry is that of 
probing the extent to which the functions normally associated with 
governance are performed in world politics without the institutions of 
government. 
(Rosenau 1992: 7) 
We can accordingly say that the focus in international relations has been on order-creating 
problems with the premise that no essential transformation is emerging in an international 
society. Young states: 
.[W]e need a more sophisticated understanding of international society, 
one that emphasizes the signi,ficance of new forms of governance in a setting 
in which states continue to serve as primary repositories of authority. 
(Young 1997: 2) 
In European integration studies, there have been two basic issues of concern. The first is 
under what conditions and by what impetus integration can go ahead or not. This research 
agenda has investigated why sovereign states would proceed beyond merely voluntary 
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cooperation. In other words, the 'spillover effect' (Cf. Schmitter 1996a) to go beyond a 
decentralised decision-making system such as an international society has been studied. This 
issue postulates the second: At what stage can we say that 'integration' is completed? 
In these streams of EU studies, we could problematise whether integration would lead up to 
the rejection of 'stateness' (Staatlichkeit)2 of Member States or not. On one hand, a strand of 
EU studies based on federalism, functionalism and neofunctionalism has considered the 
integration process as Member States' giving up stateness gradually. According to this 
perspective, the creation and evolution of the EU necessarily emerges out of the atrophy of 
stateness (Jachtenfuchs 1995: 122; Neunreither 1998: 419). On the other hand, the arguments 
for emphasising 'pooling and delegation of sovereignty' based on 'national preference 
formation' and 'interstate bargaining' (Moravcsik 1998b: 20) have also considered the 
formation of the EU not as the integration beyond international cooperation. The classical 
realist view, a fortiori, had regarded the rejection of their stateness as an impossible revolution 
(Jachtenfuchs 1995: 120; Neunreither, ibid.). In spite of the difference about the prospect of 
European integration, these two discourses have admittedly presupposed that there must be a 
trade-off between integration and stateness. The term 'integration' has accordingly meant a 
federal state formation, immolating stateness of Member States. 
Against this dichotomy, the new govemance approaches in EU studies have been trying to 
define the new reality in the present EU system. The main concern of these approaches has 
been to catch up with the transformation of nation-state. 
The language of governance brings to light the changing role and structure 
of the nation state and the emergence of the EC/EU can be seen as part of 
this process of transformation. 
(Armstrong and Bulmer 1998 : 255). 
2 Usage of this word is seen in Shaw (1999: 584) and Shaw and Wiener (2000: Introduction). In my interpretation, 
'stateness' in the literature refers to the properties which can empirically be observed in an actual state, and to the 
characteristics whiclp can theoretically be supposed in an ideally assumed state. This concept has influenced our thinking as 
normative argurnents for a modem state. Shaw and Wiener claim that both political scientists and lawyers have not been 
able to escape from 'the touch of stateness' (Ibid.). 
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The new governance approaches in EU studies have emphasised on what is overlooked if we 
are bound by the notion of nation-state. They claim that the integration does not necessarily 
cause the stateness of Member States to be undermined and hence may rather lead up to a sui 
generis system. As noted below, I think the EU certainly shows the strange conjuncture that the 
EU system has been acquiring stateness without rejecting the stateness of Member States. The 
next chapter discusses these new governance approaches. 
2 A Post National PerspectiVe 
2-1 A Sui generiS SyStem 
The institutional features observed in the EU is slippery at first glance. The EU system has 
state-like as well as non state-like institutions. The EU has one money and one market, a central 
bank, and a big budget from which some constituent units receive almost 5 per cent of their 
GDP. The EU also has a legislative power that is often supreme over Member States, common 
policies that cover almost all areas of public policy and over 80 per cent of rules about internal 
market, as well as the capacity to conclude international treaties. However, these state-like 
institutions do not have supreme authority, a centralised hierarchy of public offices, a definite 
territory, exclusive identity, and a monopoly of coercive means (Hix 1999: 3 ; Schmitter 1996b: 
1 3 1 -2). 
Jachtenfuchs points out the following three features: 1) 'uneven Europeanization', 2) 
'permanent institutional change', and 3) 'new patterns of legitimation' (Jachtenfuchs 1997a). 
The first is about 'functional subsystems of society' which are 'europeanised to largely 
different degrees' (Ibid., 3). While the economy and the legal system have been far-reaching 
about Europeanisation, 'politics and society largely remain organised within nation-state' 
(Ibid., 4). The second is about adverse situations for effective governance. Despite the fact that 
'a rather stable institutional context' would be postulated for governance, ' [t]he European 
Union . . . is characterized by a decade-long process of institutional change which is both 
incremental and deep' (Ibid.). In addition this incremental institutional changes have taken 
place both at the EU and a national level. Notwithstanding, the speed of the latter is slower than 
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the former (Ibid.). The third is about non-parliamentary democracy. It can be said not only that 
'models of democracy developed in the national context cannot be easily transferred to the 
European Union', but also that 'a political strategy based on such a transfer would not 
necessarily lead to a more democratic EU and to an increase in its legitimacy' (Ibid., 6). The 
EU system is thus exposed to an unprecedented situation which compels the EU itself to try to 
find a new model of legitimisation. 
The approval of ' differentiated integration' as a strategy for further integration makes things 
more complicated (Wessels 1998; Tuytschaever 1999; Shaw 1998; Stubb 1997; Ehlermann 
1995). 'Provisions on closer cooperation'3, which was inserted by the Amsterdam Treaty, has 
given practical expression to this problematic strategy. The differentiation can be categorised as 
the following (Ehlermann 1 995: See, Table of Categorisation of Differentiated Integration; Cf. 
Stubb 1997; Tuytschaever 1999). The first is the differentiation of time called 'multi-speed'. 
This means that, while a core group goes further, others will follow later. Examples of this are 
EM･U, a harmonisation of the VAT, articles 15 (ex 7c) EC4 in the intemal market, 30 (ex 36) 
EC in the custom union, 95 (ex 100a) EC in the approximation of laws, 134 (ex 1 15) EC in the 
commercial policy, 176 (ex 130t) EC in the environment. The second is the differentiation of 
space called 'variable geometry'. This means that permanent or irreversible separation between 
the hard core and others is allowed. Its examples are EMS, WEU, EUREKA, and the Schengen 
Agreements. The third is the differentiation of matter called '~ la carte'. This means that all 
members can 'pick-and-chose as from a menu, in which policy area they would like to 
participate, whilst at the same time holding only to a minimum number of common objectives' 
(Ibid., Table). Examples of this are the Social Charter and EMU in the case of the UK and 
Denmark, and the second pillar in the case of Denmark. 'Opt-out' and 'opt-in' about social 
policy or defense policy and 'Ins' and 'pre-Ins' concerning EMU are the terms which indicate 
these Member States. In the near future, perhaps twelve or thirteen countries will join the EU. 
The conditions of these candidates greatly vary. It is expected that the differentiation strategy 
will be inevitable. The EU system would be flexible, or otherwise be disunited, in terms of 
3 This provisions is prescribed from article 43 (ex K. 15) TEU to article 45 (ex K, 17) TEU. For a text of articles of the Treaty 
on EU, see supra note I . 
4 For a text of articles of the Treaty Establishing European Community, see supra note I . 
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time, space, and matter. Nevertheless, respect for 'acquis communautaire', which would be the 
so-called fundamental principle for constitutional architecture of the EU system, has to be 
defended to the last, according to the TEU.5 
Through this brief overview, we can perceive the logical inconsistency that exists within the 
EU system. It has been acquiring stateness without rejecting the stateness of Member States. 
Simultaneously, these features would allow us question the institutional characters of the EU 
system. Is it a federal state, or an international organisation? If both are wrong, what kind of 
polity is emerging in Europe? It appears that we face 'a sui generis political system' (Eising 
and Kohler-Koch 1999: 3) which takes the form of 'a unique set of multi-level, non-
hierarchical and regulatory institutions, and a hybrid mix of state and non-state actors ' (Hix 
1998: 38-39). Schmitter expresses the difficulty of imaging this sui generis system as follows: 
If you can do this[to imagine the EU system: Y.U.], you will have succeeded 
in at least mentally superseding the limits imposed by the nation-state upon 
our habitual ways of thinking about politics, although it may still be difficult 
for you to imagine how such a 'post-sovereign, polycentric, incongruent, 
neo-medieval' arrangement of authority could possibly be stable in the 
longer run. 
(Schmitter 1996b: 1 3 1-2) 
New governance approaches have tried to deal with this sui generis system from a 
postnational perspective.6 There have been offered several models for interpreting the sul 
generis system in these new governance approaches: 'multi-level governance' (Marks et al: 
1996), 'network governance' (Kohler-Koch 1999; Jachtenfuchs 1997a; B6rzel 1997), 'post-
modern state' (Caporaso 1996), 'fusion thesis' (Wessels and Diedrichs 1997), 'consortio' or 
'condominio' (Schmitter 1996b), and 'regulatory state' (Majone 1996). In spite of the variety, 
5 Article 43 1 (D TEU prescribes the conditions of using the closer cooperation as follows; it 'does not affect the 'acquis 
communautaire'.: For the text of Treaty, see supra note I . 
6 For the literature on new govemance approaches, we can find almost comprehensive references in bibliography of Hix 
( 1 998). 
-42-
the following seems to be cornmon among the approaches. Firstly, the EU is regarded as a sui 
generis system which is differentiated from a federal state and an international organisation. 
Secondly, the emergence of this system is interpreted as the transformation of the sovereign 
nation-state system, a notion of whose system has dominated the thinking of many social 
scientists, and influenced frameworks and concepts in social sciences. Thirdly, in order to 
overcome a cul-de-sac of analysing the postnational climate with the framework of a nation-
state, we have to pursue an anti-rationalist, a structure-centred, a reflectivist, or a social 
constructivist viewpoint. 
The concept 'governance' is useful for interpreting a sui generis system like the EU. 
Jcrgensen points out that there are several conceptual advantages to this concept (Jcrgensen 
1997). The first is that the concept 'refers to a system of rule without an implicit or explicit 
teleology in the form of a Euro-federal state' (Ibid., 2). By making govemance a core concept, 
we can escape the tenacious notion 'state'. Next, the concept 'refers to a regional integrated 
system of rule in which the Member States are no longer the exclusive possessors of legitimacy 
and authority' (Ibid.). By focussing not on government but governance, we can overcome 
classic intergovernmentalism which has regarded the EU system as simple international 
cooperation and hence has overlooked the potential of the sui generis system. Finally, the use of 
governance as a core concept makes it possible 'to transcend some of the borderlines' : 
'between domestic and international, between comparative politics and international relations, 
and between national and European law' (Ibid.). Progress would thus be made in our study of 
the postnational condition, by the use of the term 'governance'. 
2-2 ReSearch Strategies 
We should rely on the framework of Hix (1998) in order to recognise the research strategic 
consistency of new governance approaches. From these four dimensions: 1) empirical 
conception, 2) theoretical assumption, 3) method, and 4) normative prescription, Hix reviews 
new governance approaches in EU studies as a 'coherent research agenda'. This section 
presents the characteristics of these approaches, building on the basis of Hix's framework. 
Firstly, the n6w governance agenda is based upon the empirical conception (Ibid., 38-9) that 
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the EU system is 'a sui generis phenomenon' (Ibid., 54). It is a system of multi-1evel, non-
hierarchical, deliberative, and/or apolitical governance (Ibid., 39), in which we find a complex 
web of public/private ne~works and quasi-autonomous executive agencies. The complex web is 
woven up from territorial networks (Marks et al 1 996) and functional networks (cf. Wessels 
1 997). In this web, neither the state nor the market has no longer a central role in the process of 
goveming. Polycentric and mutually dependent relationships among state and non-state actors 
are observed in this process (Hix 1998: 39). This forms the basis for a new style of problem-
solving in EU governance. 
Secondly, as for the theoretical assumption (Ibid., 47-8), scholars who try to find the new 
governance in the EU system prefer institutional and structural approaches to actor-centred 
rationalist approaches. They contend that the assumption of preference-formation and strategic 
interaction based on individual rational expectations would be out of touch with reality, 
because the system is too complex and uncertain (Ibid., 48). The complex dynamics of 
institutional changes is the main target of the new governance approaches. In other words, the 
very foundation or environment of individual actors is under scrutiny. We should raise the 
scholarship of Armstrong and Bulmer (1998) about this point. Moreover, we should also refer 
to social constructivism. It has called for epistemological and ontological reflection of the 
modem simple framework that a subject can capture an object, and has emphasised identity, 
worldview, social norms, and ideas for recognising the substantive process of structural change 
(Christiansen. Jcrgensen, and Wiener 1999; Shaw and Wiener 2000). 
Thirdly, as for method (Hix 1998: 43-4), a comparison with other political systems should be 
rejected, because the EU is a sui generis system, according to the new govemance approaches. 
The approaches thereby calls on a sui generis method and a new theory. Schmitter has 
discussed this in detail. He states as follows. 
Our language for discussing politics - especially stable, iterative, 'normal' 
politics - is indelibly impregnated with assumptions about the state. 
Whenever we refer to the number, Iocation, authority, status, membership, 
capacity, identity, type or significance of political units, we employ concepts 
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that implicitly or explicitly refer to a universe featuring sovereign states and 
'their' surrounding national societies. 
(Schmitter 1996b: 132) 
According to him, we have to find 'a new vocabulary' (Ibid., 133) in order to grasp the 
developments of EU. 
Fourthly, as for the normative prescription (Hix 1 998: 54), the new governance approaches 
do not attach importance to a classical parliamentary democracy at a supranational level as 
noted above, even though it is the established ways for 'input oriented legitimization' (Scharpf 
1999: 7-10) in a modem state. Instead, the approaches seek the following; 1) 'output oriented 
legitimization ' (Ibid., I 0-13) where democratic legitimacy depends on independent expertise 
and judicial independence or 2) 'deliberative democracy' (Eriksen 1999; Cf. Habermas 1995, 
1996) in which the comitology7 can be regarded as the chance of forming a political public 
sphere (Habermas 1995; Joerges and Neyer: 1997). In this sense, the crisis of legitimacy in the 
EU is interpreted as the transitional process to a new polity. The approaches thus try to 
establish a new mode of legitimacy. A number of terms have been offered to characterise this 
mode: transparent and consensual policy-making, pareto-efficient problem-solving, individual 
civic and consumer rights, and so forth (Hix 1988: 55). But, as will be noted in chapter three, 
we should also investigate this problem of legitimacy from the viewpoint of legal norms and 
collective consciousness. 
Against these new governance approaches, Hix tries to set up a new duality in EU studies by 
claiming comparative politics approaches. He states, ' . . . the EU certainly possesses all the 
classic characteristics of a political system' (Hix 1998: 41) and 'the connection between 
politics (i.e. public opinion, party competition, dimensions of conflict) and government (i,e, the 
policy-making and legislative processes)' is 'well researched in the study of domestic 
systems' (Ibid., 55). He acknowledges that the EU system has no state form. But, according to 
7 The term 'comitology' refers to the circumstance that many committees over which no one can glance have been set up 
around the Commission and been affecting the policy-making and implementation of the EC. Not only bureaucrats at a 
national or subnatiohal level but also representatives of interest groups at an European level have bcen participating in these 
committees. For more detailed, see Shaw ( 1996: 1 59-62). 
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him, it can be regarded as a political system. The EU system has produced regulatory policies 
(internal market, social policy, environmental policy, and competition policy), redistributive 
policies (CAP, structural fund, R&D), macroeconomic stabilization policies (EMU and the 
action of ECB and Ecofin), citizen policies (police and judicial cooperation, asylum policy, and 
immigration policy) and global policies (CFSP, trade policy and development policy) (Hix 
1999: 8). Moreover, the EU system has been given the institutioris of 'an ever-wider range of 
executive, legislative and judicial powers' (Ibid., 3). He writes: 'in a different environment, 
govemment and politics could be undertaken without the classic apparatus of a state' (Ibid., 5). 
Hix thereby argues for a normal political analysis, supposing as if the EU were a domestic 
political system. 
Hix's arguments would be persuasive. H()wever, what is a domestic political system without 
a state form? How can an operation of system as such be legitimatised? For comparative 
politics, these inquiries are beyond the scope. Its interest is in the conflict concerning interest 
and power in the EU as a normal political system. The new governance approaches 
problematise the very point that the EU system operates like a state without a state form. We 
can say that a matter of concern is different between comparative politics and the new 
governance approaches. The latter is interested in grasping the structural transformation of a 
sovereign nation-state and the emerging process of a non-state polity. According to the premise 
of the approaches, this piolity must not be an embryonic federal state or international 
organisation. This approaches try to overcome a dichotomy between state-like and non state-
like form, supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism and neorealism, and 
claim that the EU system is an emerging polity of new type. 
On this point, I think it is important to inquire why the third way between a federal state and 
an international organisation should be explored. The basic interest of the new governance 
approaches lies in problematising and relativising the notion of 'sovereignty' and 'nation-
state'. In this sense, the approaches claim that the frameworks of other EU studies like 
neofunctionalisrn, Iiberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1991, 1998a, 1998b), and 
comparative politics should be rejected because they implicitly take state-centred views 
(Jachtenfucha 1997b; Jcrgensen 1997). However, with regard to liberal intergovernmentalism 
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and comparative politics, this rejection has to be reviewed more deeply, because these 
theoretical approaches acknowledge the alteration of a sovereign state system through an 
increasing interdependence of international society in the age of globalisation. Hix states a 
fortiori that the EU system is a political system without state form, as noted above. We should 
hence restate this situation more exactly: what has been rejected by the new governance 
approaches is the equilibrium point which institutional changes would necessarily lead up. So 
long as the equilibrium point of institutional changes is seen as a sovereign nation-state system, 
the notion of nation-state would admittedly stick in our minds, irrespective of a descriptive or 
prescriptive concern. The new governance approaches reject this implicitly or explicitly 
expected equilibrium point which would always gives pressure to changing institutions and to 
which institutional changes would lead up. Social constructivism just advocates these 
arguments. Social constructivists state as follows: 
Studying integration as process would mean concentrating research efforts at 
the nature of this change, asking to what extent, and in which ways, a new 
polity is being constituted in Europe. In our view, it is the constructivist 
project of critically examining transformatory processes of integration rather 
than the rationalist debate between intergovernmentalists (implicitly 
assuming that there is no fundamental change) and comparativists (implicitly 
assuming that fundamental change has already occurred) which will be 
moving the study of European integration forward. 
(Christiansen, Jcrgensen and Wiener 1999: 537) 
From a normative point of view, however, the equilibrium point of institutional changes is 
more important because it is a frame of reference for the prescriptive assessment of an 
emerging polity like the EU. If we reject the model of sovereign nation-state system as the 
equilibrium point, what can we assume instead of that model? How can we assess the new 
governance of the EU from a normative point of view without that frame of reference? We 
must reexamine the legitimacy foundation of the EU govemance. This paper claims that, in 
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order to do that, the concepts of ' Iegal order' and ' social integration' must be available. In the 
final chapter, the relation between these concepts and governance is discussed. 
3 Linking to a SociO-Legal ApproaCh 
3-1 Legal Order and Governance 
This final chapter considers the linkage between the governance approaches and a socio-legal 
approach, and presents one framework of the latter. This framework builds on the basis of the 
concept of 'legal order' and 'social integration'. 
At first, this section will examine why legal studies would be useful and necessary for the 
governance approaches, and then will discuss how to differentiate between a national, an 
international, and an EU Iegal order for identifying the postnational characteristics of EU 
governance. After that, this section considers legal norms and collective consciousness which 
are a dual dynamism for legitimisation of governance. 
On one hand, it seems that legal studies would strengthen the explanatory capability, and 
widen the scope of the new governance approaches, because law, including both statutory and 
customary laws, must be the architecture of governance. Governance is ordained by a legal 
order, because the latter is structural elements of the former. The term 'legal order' includes 
not only a system of law as references for interpretation and judgement, but also institutions of 
enactment and enforcement. It is constituted not only by a statutory law, but also customary 
law. But the latter would be more crucial when addressing to the formation of governance 
without government. Besides, we can refer to the structure of a legal order. The structure 
consists of legislative procedure, institutions for law enforcement, and a judiciary system. And 
we can also specify the function of a legal order. For example, while there is 'a law of 
conflicts, equilibrium and co-ordination', we may also suppose 'a law of solidarity and 
integration' (Pescatore 1970: 169). A Iegal order thus supports and puts governance into 
operation, and simultaneously it is the outcome of governance. 
On the other hand, we must point out that the empirical conception of the new govemance 
approaches needs to be considered in terms of legal studies. The differentiated and multi-level 
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governance of the EU, which the approaches have described as postnational characteristics, 
would present great challenges to legal studies, the judiciary, and law practices. Armstrong 
raises its practical and normative problems for law: 
as govern~nce evolves and as actors within different governance regimes 
or networks seek to recast their conflicts in legal terms, how ought law, as an 
institution, to approach such issues? 
(Armstrong 1998: 170) 
Armstrong says that there are problems with the legitimacy and representativeness of actors, i.e. 
a social partner, environmental group, or big business, who are engaged in the very network 
that distinguishes the EU governance from others (Ibid., 170-1). Moreover, the postnational 
dimension of the EU system, which the new govemance approaches have pointed out, raises 
'the challenge of building a link between integration and constitutionalism' (Shaw 1999: 586). 
Shaw writes: 
if the EU is indeed more than an international organisation but less than a 
state, how is it to proceed in terms of political organisation? It simply begs 
the question to describe the EU as an emergent postnational non-state polity. 
(Ibid.) 
If we depend on the 'touch of stateness' to capture the essence of this non-state polity, we 
would misunderstand what has happened in Europe. The significance of constitutionalism 
without prejudice to a traditional model of constitution should be investigated (Ibid.; Shaw and 
Wiener 2000) . 
The following question becomes important. What kind of a legal order is possible if the EU 
govemance is legitimate and stable? When we try to regard a sui generis system observed in the 
EU as an indication of the birth of a new type of polity, in what sense is it new? Considering 































the state' has its affinity is problematic because the new governance approaches have explored 
the structural change of the sovereign state system itself. Hence the object of legal studies 
which could contribute to the approaches might be neither an intemational law nor a national 
constitution. It might be the new legal order that corresponds to ' governance beyond the state ' , 
or this differentiation itself might be problematics. Putting the new governance approaches 
aside, we can admittedly observe two dimensions in the EU Iegal order: a dimension as a highly 
developed international law and as a developing constitution. However, inferring from the new 
governance approaches, we ought to be able to realise the originality of the EU Iegal order. As 
a theoretical assumption, therefore, we can distinguish three processes in the EU Iegal order: a 
formation process of a constitutional order as within a sovereign nation-state, an evolutional 
process of an international legal order as within international organisations, and a 
transformation process into a new polity. 
However, before addressing to these arguments, it is necessary to inquire about the problem 
of how to distinguish the difference among three legal orders. When trying to observe the 
relationship of the EU Iegal order to the other two, there can be four logical possibilities: the 
EU Iegal order is I ) differentiated not from a national but an international legal order, 2) 
differentiated not from an international but a national legal order, 3) differentiated from both, 
and 4) not differentiated from both. 
If the first or second case is relevant, we can not regard the EU Iegal order as unique. In this 
case, Iaying the foundation for EU governance is the legal order in an embryonic federal state 
or a high developed international organisation. 
If the third or fourth case is valid, it would reversely amount to the advent of a new legal 
order. The third case is plain. It means the birth of a unique legal order. To verify the validity of 
this case, we must ask whether we can say or not that the mediacy of the EU Iegal order 
produces a relation which is different from the existing one between the national and the 
international legal order in Member States. It should instantaneously be considered whether the 
relation between the national and the EU Iegal order is not equivalent to the existing one 
between the national and the international legal order in Member States. 
The fourth caise may oppositely raise a copundrum. There are two patterns: 1) the EU Iegal 
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order would become an international as well as a national legal order; 2) both a national and an 
international legal order would no longer exist, and the EU Iegal order would become only one 
legal order. Both patterns are a very strange logical possibility. The third case assumes the 
existence of a national and an international legal order. The fourth case rejects not only the 
differentiation but also the very existence of these two legal orders. How is it possible that a 
national legal order is simultaneously an international legal order? Do we have only one legal 
order that is bom of European law (Bleckmann 1983), which order is not different both from a 
national and an international legal order? We should question whether the differentiation 
between a national constitution and an international law is no longer valid. In any case, by ~ 
directing our attention to the third or fourth case, I think that we may conceptualise the legal 
order of ' governance beyond the state ' . In order to investigate these two cases in greater detail, 
we have to completely escape from the 'touch of stateness' (Shaw and Wiener 2000). 
However, these static frameworks are too simple. Reality is more complicated. Before 
continuing, we must inquire the way of problematising the relation among the three legal orders 
from broader viewpoints. The concept of governance can convert our view into a broader 
context. There are some cases in which collective actions for public problem-solving are 
organised: 1) as a government, 2) as an international organisation, and 3) as a bilateral 
cooperation. Because law is the architecture of governance, it can be said that these cases are 
governance designed: l) by a constitution, 2) by an international institutional law or multi-
lateral treaty, and 3) by a bilateral treaty respectively. The first is governance designed by a 
domestic constitutional legal order. The two latter cases are governance designed by an 
international legal order. If the EU stands on the third or fourth case noted above, it must 
perform governance designed by the legal order sui generis. 
Establishing the term 'govemance unit' corresponding to each legal order would be available 
as a means to explore the EU system for the novelty of its polity. A govemance unit is a space 
in which collective decisions are formed and executed, and is supported by, and newly 
reforming, its legal order. If differentiating among the three legal orders makes sense, there can 
be three governance units corresponding to each legal order: a national, EU, and an 
international governance unit. These units would be related to each other. One may make 
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preconditions on others, or they may cause reciprocal conflicts. As a response, we might add 
governance at a subnational level. However, as long as subnational governance emerges within 
a national legal order, it should be included in governance at the national level. Even the 
transborder network of subnational actors may be regarded as part of the govemance operation 
at the EU or international level. In short, it is important to ask about which legal order 
subnational actors are based on. However, we should take seriously that these networks of 
subnational actors can be and have been one of driving forces to cause the dynamic 
interrelationship among the three governance units . 
We can recognise a dual dynamism which operates in order to legitimise the collective 
decisions within a governance unit; these are the evolution of legal norms and the unfolding of 
collective consciousness. These two dynamisms intersect and affect each other. The function of 
governance is constantly exposed to, and simultaneously has an effect on, both dynamisms. By 
operating so, they become the forces for legitimisation of a governance unit. If we can identify 
the peculiar interrelationship between two dynamisms and grasp their respective essential 
characteristics that are indigenous to the EU governance and not observable in other 
governance units, then we would have the right to differentiate among the three legal orders and 
simultaneously could regard the EU as a legal order sui generis. We thereby have the task of 
building ideal types of a national, an international, and an EU governance unit respectively 
concerning the interrelationship between the evolution of legal norms and the unfolding of 
collective consciousness as well as their respective characteristics within the EU governance 
unit 
With regard to a national governance unit, the collective consciousness is materialised as a 
national community consisting of people; Iegal norms are crystallised as a national constitution. 
Based on the dual dynamisms as such, the political power is organised as a sovereign state. 
With regard to an international governance unit, the collective consciousness is materialised as 
a territorially divided, thin, but problem-sharing community formed from a unit of nations; 
legal norms are crystallised as an international law. Based on the dual dynamisms as such,, 
political power is organised as an international organisation or regime. 
How does an EU governance unit then operates? There are a community consisted of EU 
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citizens, treaties, agreements, Community law, and several institutions at the EU Ievel. But the 
legitimacy of the EU, which ought basically to be supported by the collective consciousness 
and legal norms, has been a notable agenda since the Maastricht. While the spread of citizens' 
skepsis that was triggered by Denmark shock has made Eurocrats and political leaders pay 
attention to the importance of 'input-oriented legitimization' (Scharpf 1999), the language of 
'deficit' compared with a political form of state has penetrated discourses on the problem of 
legitimacy (Shaw and Wiener 2000). If EU governance is supported by a particular legal order 
within a non-state polity, which we can suppose from the new governance approaches, the 
legitimisation through a frame of reference of parliamentary democracy within a nation-state is 
problematic (Jachtenfuchs 1997a), as noted above. Moreover, the EU has obviously got no 
integration mode similar to a nation-state and is not based on a fiction of social contract among 
citizens. 
We should therefore investigate how it is possible that governance without a nation-state 
framework is legitimatised. In order to address ourselves to this problem, we must promote a 
more detailed conceptional understanding about a dual dynamism. Although the complete 
accomplishment of the task is beyond this paper, the final section offers a socio-legal approach 
through examining the concept of 'social integration', as a starting point of the task. 
3-2 A Socio-Legal Approach 
This final section briefly examines the concept 'social integration' through focussing on its 
pattern of modern nation-state, and offers a socio-legal approach to investigate the relation 
between a legal order and a mode of social integration. This pattern gives us a useful ideal type 
of social integration, and it~ ideal type can be good starting point to consider 'governance 
beyond the state ' . 
Peoples living in developed countries have accepted a political form of nation-state as a 
matter of course, and peoples living in developing countries have pursued the agenda of its full 
construction in the name of 'independence' and 'modernisation'. Within this framework, 
political power has been organised 'by the people', and collective decisions for public 
problems haYe been executed 'for the people'. In short, a sovereign nation-state has been 
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considered as an edifice in which democracy is exploited even to the point where physical 
violence is converted to legitimate power. But for that, a 'nation' has to be transformed first 
into a ' people ' . This transformation takes place through ' modern social integration ' . 
The term ' social integration ' refers to the integrity of individual actors in a community based 
on a common understanding about certain norms (Habermas 1973, 1996; Lockwood 1963). To 
be socially integrated means that 'social norms' (Shaw and Wiener 2000) are imprinted via a 
general socialisation process. By doing so, social integration carries out its functions to delimit 
a community from others and to reproduce an identity of this community across generations. 
On the basis of these arguments, we can say that social integration refers to the formation 
process of a collective consciousness and simultaneously its materialisation process into a 
community. Through this process, shared norms are gradually produced and eventually 
recognised as legal norms. In short, social integration can create the pre-legal condition of the 
validity of law, which is foundation of collective decisions. 
In this modern age, a 'people' was discovered through the process of modern social 
integration. Inhabitants within a certain territory became citizens who understood themselves as 
members having the status of 'Staatsburgerschaft'. They were democratically connected with 
the political policy-making process beyond all castes, and were equally intermediated by the 
law. This new mode of social integration was the very foundation of legitimisation of political 
power without religious authority (Habermas 1996: 1 35). Social integration into a people was 
precondition for a sovereign state form because this integration made it possible to make 
collective decisions like redistribution, regulation, and sanction, as the expression of a general 
will. To be socially integrated thereby implies that a community which can make collective 
decisions is created. We can thus say that legitimacy potentially depends on a degree and mode 
of social integration. 
At the same time, a constitution of a sovereign nation-state also performed significant 
function for modern social integration, as Grimm states: 
Though in nature a complex of legal norms, the constitution is not exhausted 
in its legal validity. On the basis of its legal effect, it is instead an important 
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factor for social integration. By fixing a society's basic consensus as to the 
principles of its co-existence and the settlement of its disputes, it links 
holders of different convictions and interests, enables them to settle their 
differences peacefully and facilitates the acceptance of defeats. 
(Grimm 1995: 245) 
But, I think that, while modern social integration has certainly been promoted by a modern 
constitution, the shared minimum norms, Iaying the foundation of a constitution, were formed 
through the process of social integration. In other words, modern social integration was the 
prerequisite for a constituent power, whereas the very operation of a constitution has reinforced 
a degree of social integration. We shou:Id suppose the interrelationship between social 
integration and constitution. 
Along with the formation process of a constitution, modern social integration created a law 
community within a territory. The degree and form of modern social integration into a 
sovereign nation-state defined the boundary of a national legal order. Within the boundary 
congruent to a nation-state, key conception is collectivity for construction of a general will 
which is reflection of, as well as prerequisite for, sovereignty. This collectivity is necessary, on 
the one hand, for external articulation and representation of collective interests, and on the other 
hand, for internal collective decisions. The notion 'social integration' was thus in reference to 
the potential to legitimatise the very existence of a law community where a general will would 
be uncovered and realised. 
The European modern sovereign nation-states, as a law community being clearly delimited 
from others, had the final responsibility for rights of citizens. Along with its responsibility, a 
political mobilisation of inhabitants as citizens through democratic organisation of political 
power became a firm base for collective decisions (Habermas 1992, 1995, 1996). The 
emergence of a non-state polity like the EU, therefore, makes us confront the following 
problems. To what degree is it possible to make collective decisions without a nation-state 
mode of social integration? What mode of social integration would and could legitimatise the 
EU Iegal order in 'governance beyond the state' ? What kind of social integration would be 
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prerequisite for the EU Iegal order? 
It is this point that has been furiously argued since the 'Maastricht decision' of the German 
Constitutional Court, which offered 'No Demos' thesis (Weiler 1995). The EU has been 
regarded as a democratically deficient polity because of the condition of no 'demos' (political 
unity within a public sphere on the basis of conscious citizens' social contract). In relation to 
these arguments, it has been questioned whether it is possible without integration based on 
'ethnos' (ethno-culturally pre-political unity) to create the very foundation of democracy 
(Mancini 1998; Weiler 1995, 1998; Grimm 1995; Habermas 1995). 
We can not say that modern nation-state mode of social integration is the only possibility for 
collective decisions. As noted above, Iaw is the architecture of governance. And indeed, 
governance at the EU Ievel has been developing. It is, therefore, important to exploit the pre-
legal conditions of the validity of legal norms within the EU governance unit, and to examine 
the mode of social integration as a precursor to that condition. If the postnational mode of 
social integration which substantively legitimatises the EU Iegal order can be identified, then 
we can find the way to interpret the EU governance as the emergence of a new type of polity. 
For that reason, the relation between legal norms, which is the basis of a legal order, and the 
collective consciousness, which is materialised through social integration, should be analysed 
carefully. As a theoretical assumption, the governance structure can be captured from the 
features of its legal order and mode of social integration. And this mode is a sociological 
condition of the EU Iegal order through which legitimacy and efficiency of EU govemance are 
solidly founded. The research strategy as such can be called a socio-legal approach. This paper 
claims that this approach is important in order to interpret the sui generis of EU governance 
from a postnational perspective. 
COncIUSion 
I think that the new governance approaches have the broad scope to grasp the dynamic 
transformation of communitie･s in this age of globalisation. The approaches are especially 
suggestive when we grope around in the dark for a postnational model in the formation process 
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of broader law communities like the EU. However, as this paper has discussed, the approaches 
have to extend the research target to legal orders. The grounds for the legitimisation of 
collective decisions depend on a mode of social integration, which must affect the development 
of legal orders. 
We can regard the development of the EU Iegal order as part of the historical self-realisation 
process of European legal norms. Europe was never a single unitary community from the 
outset. European legal norms have been created in the process of cultural and political conflicts 
over a long period of time. At 'a new stage in the process of European integration' 8, are 
European legal norms forming themselves into an international, a constitutional or a new legal 
order? This question is important for the new governance approaches which regard the EU as a 
sui generis system. We must ask about how legal norms are produced through social integration 
and what relation there is between a legal order and a mode of social integration. This socio-
legal approach is necessary to attain the foundation of 'governance beyond the state'. 
8 From the preamb]e of Treaty on EU, For the text of the treaty, see supra note I . 
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